. 13 "Extremely graphic or explicit." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY 799 (4th ed. 1994). "Hard-core" and "soft-core" are terms adopted by producers and consumers of pornography to differentiate between materials that depict actual sexual acts or aroused genitalia and materials that only show nudity or simulated sex. The hardcore/soft-core distinction was also once thought to mark the line between obscenity and protected speech. Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Obscenity, 2004 NEW ATLANTis 75, 80. Since the U.S. Supreme Court established a standard that allows producers of hardcore films to escape prosecution if their materials have "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," the distinction has lost its legal significance, although it retains a rhetorical one. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973 and thought to signal the end of obscenity law as we know it.
2 6 In December 2005, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, admonishing it for departing from the well-trod path of First Amendment jurisprudence and remanded the case for consideration under that doctrine. 27 After being denied a rehearing en banc, defendants' attorneys Louis Sirkin and Jennifer Kinsley petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and were denied in May 2006. 28 Extreme Associates represents the battles we can expect if obscenity prosecutions are revived. The obscenity doctrine authorizes the most conservative communities in the United States, guided by prosecutors, to decide whose sexuality is healthy and whose is criminally deviant. 29 Rob Black and Lizzie Borden, the owners of Extreme Associates, were the perfect defendants to prosecute under this standard: The loudest and crassest of pornographers, their films challenge even the norms of the sex industry. Still, the district court recognized their products as part of the consensual, adult, and private sex lives of their consumers and therefore as protected from government intrusion." This surprising ruling must be understood as a product of a post-Lawrence v. Texas legal world, and it reflects the recognition and acceptance of sexual diversity Lawrence represented. It also must be understood in the context of a world transformed by the Internet, where a universe of pornography is accessible to the most isolated farmer with a computer, making an absurdity of the community-standards approach to First Amendment doctrine. No matter how fervently 26 28 Id. H. Louis Sirkin, the defendants' attorney, was originally optimistic about the case's chances at the Supreme Court: "They said we had the right to bring the issue, and that puts us way ahead of the game. The important thing is having won it in the district court, because we can now go forward with our appeals .. .without having exposed our client to the danger of what potentially could happen in a trial." Mark Kernes, Black Back Under Attack: Extreme Charges Reinstated, AVN (Jan. 1, 2006), http:// www.avn.com/index.php?Primary-Navigation=legal&Action=view.Article&Content_ ID=253686. 29 As will be explored at length, the standard for obscenity is (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) [Vol. 10:155 conservative forces wish it, a doctrine that jails people for private sexual expression is repulsive to our current appreciation for sexual autonomy." Although Extreme Associates is lost, the Supreme Court must face these inexorable changes and devise a new interface between sexual expression and the law. The doctrine of substantive due process-which protects the individual right to personal autonomy through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-is a good place to start.
This Article begins with a short review of the obscenity doctrine under the First Amendment and the privacy doctrine under substantive due process. Parts II and III present the district court and Third Circuit opinions, respectively. Part IV tests the strength of the district court opinion by revisiting the holdings of Lawrence and Stanley. Part V argues that the Third Circuit, in reversing the district court, both misapplied stare decisis principles and missed an opportunity to address the failings of the obscenity doctrine. Part VI explores why this doctrine no longer makes sense for our time. Part VII encourages pornography producers and consumers called before the courts 3 2 to argue for a substantive due process analysis grounded in the personal autonomy interests actually at stake in their prosecutions. The article concludes by imagining what might develop if the obscenity doctrine were dismantled and porn performers were allowed a say in how the law impacts their lives.
I. Two DOCTRINES, ONE RIGHT?
Extreme Associates employed two doctrines-the obscenity doctrine under the First Amendment and the privacy doctrine under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause-to argue that its customers are entitled to its products. 3 3 This section will provide a brief introduction to these two doctrines and to the contro- 31 Calvert & Richards, supra note 26, at 434 (suggesting that the mainstreaming of pornography led to the district court's decision in Extreme Associates). 32 In May 2005 , there were twenty obscenity prosecutions pending across the United States. Calvert & Richards, supra note 26, at 448. Syracuse University's Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) is an independent, non-partisan organization that compiles reports about federal enforcement, staffing, and spending. According to a TRAC report, despite increased agency staffing, federal prosecutions have dropped across-the-board-except in the area of pornography. Pornography prosecutions have experienced an eight-fold increase in the past ten years. TRANSAC 
A. The Due Process Clause and Sexual Privacy
Although it is articulated nowhere in the Constitution, privacy has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a constitutional right for two reasons. First, it is a fundamental right, older than the constitution, that the court should uphold as a part of liberty. Second, privacy is necessary to give effect to rights articulated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments; therefore, the Court finds it is rooted in the penumbras of those Amendments. 35 The Court has held the right to privacy to be a fundamental right under the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses, 3 6 which state that "[no person shall] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 7 When a right is asserted under the Fifth Amendment, the court first determines whether it is fundamental, by asking if it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed. '38 If the court answers these questions in the affirmative, the right is fundamental, and any infringement must pass strict scrutiny analysis." If the court answers in the negative, the right is not fundamental, and its infringement must only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 4° Through this analysis, a fundamental right to privacy has been found within certain relationships, such as marriage and family; in certain acts, such as child-rearing and procreation; and in certain places, such as the home. 41 In 49 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home."). 50 Id. Justice Kennedy's sweeping language about the scope of liberty and the dignity of homosexual persons at first energized the gay rights movement. 57 Sadly, Lawrence proved to be more bark than bite; plaintiffs have had trouble using it to expand the rights of sexual minorities 5 " or even to invalidate other sodomy statutes. 63 Id. Which substantive due process analysis Lawrence applied is thought by many to answer whether it found a fundamental right in that liberty. Because Lawrence court held that the narrower right to use sex toys is neither "deeply rooted" nor "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and remanded the case to the lower court to decide whether the prohibition survives rational basis scrutiny.
6 4 The dissent argued that a right to sexual privacy pre-existed and was affirmed by Lawrence, citing language that makes clear the Lawrence Court's placement of intimate relationships within the scope of liberty. 6 5 Williams illustrates the confusing hand that Lawrence has dealt both advocates and opponents of sexual liberty.
In Extreme Associates, the district court takes up this hand and plays it well: On substantive due process grounds, the court found the obscenity statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendants, even though comparable statutes have been upheld for decades almost exclusively under the First Amendment. 6 6 The following section will briefly summarize the doctrine dealing with obscene pornography under the First Amendment.
B. The First Amendment and Obscenity
The text of the First Amendment unequivocally protects an individual's right to speak without fear of government sanction by stating "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Hunter argues that the lack of fundamental-rights analysis resulted from the opinion's "decisional structure," which entailed first asking whether the government had succeeded in justifying the law with even a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1117. Since the government failed to meet this minimum threshold, the Court did not need to reach the question of whether the right was fundamental; the law could not pass even rational-basis scrutiny. Id. at 1116. Hunter also points out that the Court's pervasive characterization of the right at stake as equal in importance to other liberty interests makes this question largely technical. Id. at 1117. 64 The Court has struggled to define the parameters of obscenity. Roth vaguely delineated obscenity as material that appeals to the "prurient interest" in sex and that goes beyond "customary limits" in describing sexual activity, giving the state broad powers to regulate without constitutional review. 7 2 A decade later, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, a plurality held that the First Amendment should apply to materials that appeal to the prurient interest in sex, unless the material is "utterly without redeeming social value." 73 After that opinion, the weight of the Court was against finding materials obscene and for protecting pornography as speech. Soon after Memoirs, the Supreme Court decided Stanley v. Georgia, invalidating a statute that criminalized an individual's private possession of obscenity. 75 The Court conceded that the materials involved were obscene, but held that First Amendment protection should nevertheless apply.
7 6 The government's interest in preventing public distribution of obscenity, implicated by the distributors and producers in Roth, 7 7 was inapplicable to a case of private possession.
7 " The Court held that the First Amendment right to receive information, regardless of its social worth, was "fundamental 68 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942 [Vol. 10:155 to our free society," and this right was buttressed here by the "also fundamental" Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in one's own home. 7 9 The Court found that the government's justifications for the obscenity statutes could not outweigh the plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 80 Stanley's significance was doomed to pale, and the Court narrowed its holding in three subsequent cases, holding that Stanley could never apply to obscenity found outside of the home. 8 On the district court level, the defendants were indicted before a grand jury for violations of 18 U.S.C. § § 1461, 1462, and 1465, which proscribe the use of the Internet for the transportation or delivery of obscene materials. 9 5 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to them. They conceded that their videos were obscene by Milds "community standards," 9 6 but claimed that the statutes violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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Judge Lancaster's opinion granting defendants' motion began with a detailed description of the Internet, its history, and its current scope. 98 The court then turned to the uncontested facts about
Extreme Associates' website. 99 To access video clips and images on the site, visitors must provide their name, address, and credit card, which is billed monthly for membership or separately for each video ordered. 0 0 As part of the prosecution, an investigator went through this process, viewing clips involving urination, double penetration, and gang bangs; and ordering three videos through the mail.' 0 1 The district court affirmed that the defendants validly asserted third-party standing on behalf of their clients, citing a line of landmark privacy cases for the proposition that a vendor purveying (PBS television broadcast Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wbgh/pages/frontline/ shows/porn/etc/script.html. Sexuality-rights activists condemned the list as an attempt to distance the "legitimate" pornography industry from the illegitimate one. 99 Id. at 581. By extolling the achievements of the Internet in affording low-cost global communication and then turning to how carefully these porn producers protected audiences from stumbling across their materials, the court effectively distinguished this context from the context in which the Miller standard was born. This approach also follows in the tradition of Reno v. ACLU, an obscenity-related Supreme Court case where Justice Stevens described the Internet's history at length from its birth as a military prototype to the chatrooms, search engines, and cyber-communities of today, concluding that "the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought." 521 U.S. 844, 850-53 (1997).
100 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 581. 101 Id. at 584.
goods that the buyer has a fundamental right to possess can assert third-party standing on behalf of that buyer. 1 0 2 The court then maintained that, although there is no First Amendment right to obscene speech, Stanley established a fundamental right to receive information regardless of its social worth. 1 " 3 According to the district court, this Stanley right to view or receive obscenity in one's own home rested both in the First Amendment and in the Fourteenth Amendment.
0 4 The court recalled that subsequent cases asserting a right to distribute obscenity based on Stanley failed, but those had been First Amendment challenges.
0 5 No controlling case had been argued exclusively on the due process right to privacy. 10 6 The district court then analyzed Lawrence v. Texas, finding that, while it did not create a broad right to sexual privacy, it did hold that the government cannot justify a criminal law impacting sexual privacy by asserting that the acts it prohibits are immoral." 0 7
The district court applied these doctrinal elements to the obscenity statutes and to Extreme Associates' website, reaffirming that Extreme Associates clients have a right to view obscenity under the Due Process Clause. 1 0 Because this fundamental right was denied by the outright ban in the federal obscenity statutes, the Court reasoned that strict scrutiny should apply. Under strict scrutiny, the government must assert a compelling interest to which the statutes curtailing fundamental rights are narrowly tailored." 9 The government offered two possible interests: the protection of unwitting adults and the protection of minors. 1 
109
Id. 110 Id. The court noted that the government requested and was granted time to file an additional brief asserting a compelling interest that was narrowly tailored, but failed to do so. Id. In all of its briefs, the government argued that rational-basis review should apply. Id.
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were certainly compelling to the court, the statutes were not narrowly tailored to achieving them. They over-included the very website at issue, which did not pose any risk to unwitting adults or children. The website's screening mechanisms already effectively guarded children from the material; these identical mechanisms had been proffered by agency regulations as effective means of screening."' In addition, the court observed, courts have held that bans on material not suitable for children must provide exemptions to adults in order to be constitutional. 1 2 The court found that the website protected unwitting adults from exposure to its content by requiring that they pay and consent to see the material. " According to the court, the obvious failure of the statutes to be narrowly tailored to these interests belied a truth about obscenity laws: A complete ban, first and foremost, restricts adults who want to see pornography from seeing it. A law criminalizing adult, consensual, private sexual conduct could only have been enacted in the interest of morality," 4 and after Lawrence, morality is not a legitimate-let alone compelling-interest." 5 In a rare acknowledgment of sexual autonomy, the district court held that the statutes as applied were unconstitutional.
III. THE DEVIANT COURT IS CHASTISED
In a unanimous three-judge panel, the Third Circuit reversed the district court," 6 holding that it should have upheld the ob- 113 Id. at 593. Extreme Associates' website includes an extensive warning page, including such statements of affirmation that it is the viewers' right as adults to view sexually explicit material and the models' and producers' right to produce it. It demands that viewers enter their birth date and electronic signature, under penalty of perjury, in an effort to comply with the Child Online Protection Act. It also includes the company's address and real names of the owners, in an effort to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 2257.
114 See id. at 592-93 ("It cannot be seriously disputed that, historically, the government's purpose in completely banning the distribution of sexually explicit obscene material, including to consenting adults, was to uphold the community sense of morality."). articulated a principle to guide lower courts when they are confronted by conflicting Supreme Court precedent. This principle recognizes that at times a Supreme Court case will contradict a prior case without directly overruling it. 125 In such cases, plaintiffs may argue that the more recent case implies a shift in the reasoning of the Court, and lower courts are within their rights to discuss this argument, preserving it for appeal.' 26 Lower courts, however, do not have the authority to declare one Supreme Court case overruled by another if the Supreme Court has not expressly declared so itself. According to the Third Circuit, Agostini decreed that lower courts "should follow the case which directly controls, leav- 32 -all upheld federal obscenity statutes by saying that there is no "correlative right" to distribute pornography based on Stanley's right to own."' The Third Circuit found no reason why this broad First Amendment principle should not apply here. 3 4 Even if Stanley articulated a separate substantive due process right to possess obscenity, the Third Circuit reasoned that post-Stanley cases limited that right. They mentioned privacy and ruled against the plaintiffs anyway, because that right was not triggered. 1 3 5 Specifically, Orito held that "no constitutionally protected privacy is involved" in the transport of obscene material, 3 6 and Paris Adult Theater defined the privacy right in Stanley as "restricted to a place, the home." 3 7 The other doctrinal distinction-that these cases involved defendants asserting their First Amendment right to distribute or transport obscenity, not defendants asserting their clients' Fifth Amendment right to privately own obscene material-did not trouble the Third Circuit. " ' 8 The district court should have applied the standard First Amendment analysis because these distinctions did not "negate the binding precedential value of the [post-Stanley] cases." 139 The Third Circuit asserted that at least one post-Stanley case was not even factually distinguishable. 4° Extreme Associates argued that Twelve 200-Ft Reels and Thirty-Seven Photographs were based on the government's heightened interest in regulation at the border. The Third Circuit conceded that this might have been the case, but Orito could still provide binding precedent. 4 ' Extreme Associates argued that Orito, the only post-Stanley case treating interstate commerce in obscenity, was decided before the Internet fundamentally transformed how that commerce takes place. 14 2
The Third Circuit was "satisfied," however, that the change was not so profound since the Supreme Court had never recognized it; as long as Internet commerce was still commerce, it could still be constitutionally regulated by the federal government. 1 4 3
The circuit court concluded that Extreme Associates should have been controlled by the post-Stanley cases, rather than by Stanley itself.' 4 4 By using Lawrence to fashion a due process right to receive obscenity, the district court impermissibly implied that Lawrence overruled these obscenity cases. The Third Circuit ended its analysis without considering the implications that Lawrence and the Internet may have for obscenity laws. It left that privilege to the Supreme Court. 45 IV. AN 144 Id. at 160-61. "Extreme Associates correctly quotes dicta from Reno v. ACLU, indicating that the Internet is 'a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide communication.'" Id. at 160. However, "the Court thus far has not suggested that obscenity law does not apply to the Internet or even that a new analytical path is necessary in Internet cases." Id. at 160-61. 145 Id. at 162. 
DEVIANT DREAMS
Extreme Associates made their name-and ultimately sealed their fate-by being extreme. 4 7 Their videos contain-as conservative pundits and journalists never fail to point out-simulated rape, suffocation, urination, anal penetration, women having sex with many men in sequence, and adults pretending to be children. 1 4 Their products may be outside even the porn industry's community standards. Scholars Clay Calvert and Robert D. Richards quote Paul Cambria, a renowned obscenity defense lawyer, as saying "I don't think that guys like Rob Black and Extreme Associates are the ones that should be fighting the battle of free speech in the adult fields..
-4" Cambria would probably prefer companies like Vivid Video, which last year garnered a billion dollars in sales and has been described as the "porn industry equivalent of Paramount," to lead the fight to establish pornography's legitimacy.
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However, as Calvert and Richards argue, it often takes an extremist to enlarge the boundaries of liberty for everyone. 5 ' Extreme Associates has aligned itself with two other marginalized extremists, the cases of Stanley and Lawrence. Both of these cases promised to expand protected liberty to include sexual expression, and both have been so limited by subsequent cases that their foot-(on file with the Author). Lena Ramon has been in over 800 pornography films during her career and has performed with Extreme Associates in over fourteen of them. "I loved working for Extreme," Ramon said. "I had a scene at Extreme the evening a Nightline episode profiling Extreme aired, and the guy from their office came running in and said, 'Oh my god, in the half-hour after it aired, we got 75,000 hits on the website!' It was great advertising-too bad they're going to jail because it worked so well." Id. 147 See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 2. 
A. The District Court's Use of Stanley
The district court in Extreme Associates quotes compelling language from Stanley: Allowing the government to criminalize possession of obscenity would lead to the dangerous conclusion that "the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts." ' 5 3 However, the district court use of Stanley is narrower. Stanley recognized a fundamental right to receive speech in the privacy of one's home, regardless of its social worth.
1 5 4 This right is constitutionally supported by the First Amendment-because it is about expression and ideas-and by the Due Process Clause-because it is about personal privacy. The district court only uses Stanley for its framing of the right to possess obscenity as a substantive due process right. 15 5 However, Stanley itself warned future plaintiffs that, although they may have the right to possess obscenity, the government retained the power to prosecute purveyors of obscenity. 156 The district court asserted that these cases were not control- One scholar claimed that the district court executed an "endrun" around these post-Stanley cases and predicted correctly that it would be overturned for its audacity.' 7 4 However, all of these 1970s cases are arguably distinguishable on their facts as they do not contemplate instantaneous and private transmission of materials over the Internet. In the world in which Orito and Thirty-Seven Photographs were decided, the distinction between outside and inside the home was rational: Materials found outside were in commerce, which Congress has power to regulate, and materials found inside the home, which is protected against intrusion, were in private possession. The materials that Extreme Associates claims its clients have the right to possess will not be confiscated at a border or found in the trunk of a car on their way from producer to consumer. They go from the possession of the purveyor to the possession of the consumer in a second, over an inscrutable path. The question becomes whether this kind of commerce arouses the same interest in "protecting the public commercial environment" that justifies older regulations. Even if the Government can assert this interest in the context of the Internet, it may not be valid after Lawrence.' 76 The Orito Court justified government regulation of obscenity through the government's interest in morality, citing a host of seminal Commerce Clause cases where the government based its regulation of drugs, prostitution, lotteries, and obscenity on preventing the "spread of any evil," among other intangibles.' 7 7 The legitimacy of this interest was unquestioned in that era, but Lawrence arguably debunks it. District Judge Lancaster only mentions this possibility before turning to the due process analysis,' but it is clear that the advent of the Internet and Lawrence have possibly eroded obscenity law under the First Amendment as well.
B. The District Court's Use of Lawrence
Although the defendants encouraged the court to find that Lawrence stands for a fundamental right to sexual privacy, the district court declined to do so; indeed, it did not need to do so.' 7 9
The substantive due process analysis rested on the fundamental right articulated in Stanley, not that in Lawrence.""( The district court used Lawrence only for the proposition that morality is "not even a legitimate state interest that can justify infringing one's liberty interest to engage in consensual sexual conduct in private.'' The court also did not assert that morality is invalidated as a legitimate interest in general, but only in relation to an intrusion on private, consensual, adult sexual expression, which includes the behavior of watching obscene pornography. 8 2 By reading Lawrence this narrowly, the district court sidestepped the pitfalls that usually accompany Lawrence while staying true to its vision of valuing the sexual autonomy interests at stake.
A comparison to Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama shows how the district court used Lawrence differently from other courts narrowing the precedent. 3 The defendants in Williams also brought a substantive due process challenge to an obscenity law, but one contending that Lawrence established a fundamental right to sexual privacy. 184 Only the dissent in Williams raised the alternative claim that morality is not a legitimate interest for regulating even non-fundamental rights. 8 5 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed this contention in a footnote, finding it difficult to believe that "such a traditional and significant jurisprudential principle has been jettisoned wholesale."' 1 8 6 Scholars and even Supreme Court justices have argued that this is exactly what Lawrence has done. Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence lambasted the majority for holding that morality is not a legitimate state interest, and, in so doing, he outlined the potential breadth of this holding. 8 7 His parade of laws "called into question" included adultery laws, obscenity laws, and the exclusion of gays from the military; as well as laws against bestiality, incest, and bigamy. 188 Scholars saw the jettisoning of some morals-based legislation as a fortunate and logical consequence of Lawrence, i8 9 but viewed Justice Scalia's fire-and-brimstone language as not supported by Lawrence or the cases he cited. 9 ' Most of these laws exist to protect against more concrete harms, such as those to an animal who cannot consent, to an injured spouse, or to the so-called unity of the armed forces. However, the district court did not go as far as Justice Scalia, or even as far as his critics, in its interpretation of Lawrence. It did not claim that morality could no longer be a legitimate interest for all laws, but only for those that criminalize private consensual adult sexual expression.
V. STARE DECISIS OR COUP D'ETAT?
Instead of addressing the merits of the substantive due process arguments made in district court, the Third Circuit focused on whether the district court could rule on those arguments at all. The Third Circuit employed an emphatic statement of the most basic principle in our common law system-stare decisis 19 -to argue that the district court had no business agreeing with the defendants' creative arguments, even if they were right. 9 2 A principle just as fundamental to the common law, however, is change. 19 It is imperative, then, to decide whether the district court actually stepped outside of its authority, or whether the Third Circuit failed to comprehend that the legal and factual circumstances before it were truly new and untested. This Part will explore this question and ask why the Third Circuit, with its famously pro-First Amendment bench, 1 94 may have avoided addressing the merits of the arguments.
The Third Circuit invoked Agostini 19 5 and Rodriguez de Quijas' 9 6 as cases that govern how lower courts should deal with precedent that seems to have been "implicitly overruled" by subsequent precedent of the same weight.' 9 7 Circuit courts have often applied these cases in reversing district court opinions for overstepping their authority and engaging in speculation about the reasoning of higher courts. 9 8 However, these cases usually involve a party directly claiming that a binding, precedential case should not apply because its reasoning has been eroded by subsequent cases.' 99 In Extreme Associates, the district court's central holding was not that Lawrence overruled Miller-although many scholars would agree with that statement-instead it was that the First Amendment analysis simply does not apply to this substantive due process claim. The fundamental gap, then, between the Third Circuit and district court is their differing views of the relationship between the First and Fifth Amendments. The district court treated the substantive due process claim before it and saw no reason to "reach" into the First Amendment for precedent, even though that was where cases dealing with obscenity had usually been decided. 2°°T he district court acknowledgment of the post-Stanley line of First Amendment cases was secondary to its holding. The Third Circuit saw the defendants' motion to overturn an obscenity indictment and treated it under the obscenity doctrine, thereby not "reaching" into a doctrine that was supposedly unrelated to obscenity. 20 1 If one regards the First and Fifth Amendments as wholly separate except in the unique case of Stanley, then the district court opinion is a strict application of stare decisis.
20 2 Under substantive due process, the defendants asserted the fundamental right established in Stanley and questioned what interest would be served by infringing that right after Lawrence. The obscenity cases were not applicable because privacy rights were not asserted in those cases.
2 01 However, if one sees the two doctrines as interwoven-at least after Stanley---then these cases were directly applicable, and the court's refusal to apply them was an attack on the obscenity doctrine bolstered by Lawrence.
4
Even if the Third Circuit's understanding of the relationship between the First and Fifth Amendments is more compelling, it underestimated the singularity of this case. As the Third Circuit acknowledged, factual distinctions alone could have made the prior obscenity cases inapplicable and freed the district court to hear a creative argument tying unique facts to the only relevant law.
20 5 None of the post-Stanley Supreme Court cases involved defendants claiming third-party standing on behalf of their clients' right to privacy. 20 6 The fact that the privacy right in Stanley was not properly asserted by any of these defendants does not mean that it was not properly asserted in Extreme Associates. The district court was defending the right of the individual to view obscene materials on her computer in her home.
20 7 If Stanley is still good law, it may be the only case that directly governs these facts. By not applying Stanley, the Third Circuit engaged in the same impermissible reasoning of which it accuses the district court: implying that a Supreme Court decision has been virtually overruled by subsequent cases when the Supreme Court has never explicitly said as much.
By asserting the Agostini principle, the Third Circuit avoids speaking its mind on the questions that it considers central: Whether Lawrence overrules the obscenity doctrine by implication, and whether the Internet has created a need for new law. It could have used the opportunity differently, construed Lawrence as narrowly as other courts have, 20 what he chooses in the privacy of his own home by completely banning the distribution of obscene materials."). In fact, none of the postStanley, pre-Internet cases could have raised this claim in quite the same way as Extreme Associates. Only in the Internet age can one reference a hypothetical third-party consumer for whom obscene materials magically appear in the privacy of his home. 208 See supra text accompanying note 63.
Internet that foreclosed such arguments for future plaintiffs. Perhaps the Third Circuit intended to analogize this case to the situation in Agostini, wherein the Supreme Court-while asserting the limits of lower courts' power-admitted that to adhere to its own precedent in this case "would work a 'manifest injustice. '-209 Agostini is cited most often by federal courts for the principle that stare decisis is "not an inexorable command." 21 0 The Third Circuit also cited itself in a case where it credited the lower court's reasoning, even though it felt the obligation to reverse. 2 1 a It is possible that the Third Circuit considered the district court's position here similarly worthy. By not considering the merits, the Third Circuit may have shown a lack of courage, but it also pointed out issues with which the Supreme Court will eventually have to contend. The following section will argue that Lawrence expresses-and the Internet has wrought-societal changes that reveal the obscenity doctrine as oppressive, illogical, and, finally, obsolete.
VI. A TYRANNY OF YOUR PEERS

A. "Prurient Interests" After Lawrence
The ' 215 This section will argue that the Miller standard is rooted in the very morality interests invalidated in Lawrence and it will discuss the idea of preventing "moral harm" and why that idea unsettles activists on both sides of the obscenity debate-as well as the Supreme Court itself.
Miller asks a jury to apply the standards of its local community and decide whether the material before it appeals to the "prurient interest," meaning a "shameful or morbid interest," in sex. 2 16 It next asks whether the material is "patently offensive" to those community standards. Finally, it asks the jury to determine whether a reasonable person could find serious value in the material, despite its shameful appeal and patent offensiveness. 21 7 The jury is never given a legal definition of what might be "shameful" or "offensive" or what might have "value." The distinction between obscenity and mere pornography, on which might hang a fifty-year jail sentence, is made through the instinctual and unguided reaction of twelve people representing a local community. The only possible description of the jury's role is as moral arbiter.
Professor Andrew Koppelman explains the important distinction between moral and tangible harms. 2 1 ' The Miller standard, as justified in Paris Adult Theater, rests on the principle that "good books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character" while "obscene books .. have a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact. 219 Obscenity laws are not reliant on the government interest in preventing tangible harms that supposedly flow from obscenity, such as violence to women, or supposedly inhere in its making, such as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. This explains why the doctrine has not been successfully dismantled by critics who show that obscenity does not actually result in these tangible harms.
2 2 ' Koppelman argues that the government's interest actually is in preventing moral harm, defined as harm to a viewer's morals, regardless of consequences to her behavior and the outside world.
The history of the obscenity doctrine demonstrates its roots in, and commitment to, preventing this kind of internal moral harm. In the nineteenth century, courts used the English common law "bad tendency" test, defining obscenity as material tending "to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences ... .,,221 Judge Learned Hand first advocated a "community standards" approach, where "the word 'obscene' [would] indicate the present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame;" the consensus of the community as to what will cause moral harm. 2 2 2 The Supreme Court in Roth and Miller made Judge Hand's "community standards" approach the law of the land.
Lawrence's argument that the right to make private sexual decisions is an integral safeguard of human liberty and dignity has obvious bearing here.
2 26 The obscenity doctrine requires the jury to judge not only the material, but also its own responses to it and the projected responses of others. 227 The jury members are asked if the material appeals to that wrong part of themselves and their neighbors. They are allowed, alternatively, to distance themselves from the portrayal of "aberrant sexual activities" by deciding that, although they would never find such filth stimulating, some deviant sexual group may.
2 28 Obscenity prosecutions allow the government to attach criminal penalties to materials that cater to abnormal desires, while protecting "good, old-fashioned, healthy" pornography as free speech. The moral distinction between good sexual desire and deviant sexual desire, especially made in a context where all desires on the table are those of consenting adults, begins to look startlingly like the moral distinction between homosexual desire and heterosexual desire that Lawrence holds cannot be the basis for criminal laws. The state must justify its laws on tangible harms, not moral discrimination. 229 Before Lawrence, the Supreme Court had expressed its discomfort in justifying a prohibition on sexual speech solely on morality in the famously confounding nude-dancing cases.
based on the governmental interest in morality. 23 1 Souter, in a concurring opinion, held that the prohibition should be upheld "not on the possible sufficiency of society's moral views," but on the "secondary effects" which result: promotion of prostitution, spread of sexually transmitted disease, and decline in property values. 23 2 Nine years later, the Court reversed Barnes with another plurality opinion in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. 23 3 This time, the slim majority adopted Souter's "secondary effects" logic, downplaying the purely moral interests. 23 4 After Lawrence, the Supreme Court's rejection of morality as a government interest is clear, and the Court must reckon with what this means for the obscenity doctrine generally.
Andrew Koppelman argues that even if preventing moral harm was a compelling goal, the Miller standard reflects the "inevitable clumsiness" of any legal attempt to address such a subtle and complex issue.
23 5 All literature influences moral development by promoting a certain understanding of the way the world is or should be.
236
For example, some pornography may promote selfcenteredness and objectification of others. 2 3 7 However, any condemnation of this moral effect is complicated. Self-centeredness and objectification may be a natural, even healthy part of the sexual experience. 23 8 These attitudes are obviously not promoted only by pornography, but by many aspects of our economy and culture. 239 However, obscenity laws only prohibit materials that are sexual in nature.
2 4° Moreover, which sexual materials are banned and which are left alone reveal, in some cases at least, an interest not in preventing objectification but promoting it. Playboy can are a result of the Supreme Court's Freudian anxiety when confronted with the naked female form).
231 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion ( arguing that "you cannot understand pornography's content or function on a literal level" because a person's experience of a certain fantasy is coded in subconscious symbols, so that a fantasy of sexual subjugation may provide a feeling of, and actually be about, sexual empowerment).
238 Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1650-51. 239 See id. at 1652.
freely publish "soft-core" photographs of naked women of color, portraying them in the text as "exotic beauties," and thus support a dangerously objectifying and racist sexual script. 241 ' As long as the photographs do not contain sex acts, this magazine cannot be prosecuted for obscenity. 24 2 Meanwhile, the Cambria List circulates the porn industry, advising companies against portraying inter-racial sex, female ejaculation, gay male sex, sado-masochism, and transsexuals if they want to avoid prosecution. 43 There are arguments to be made that a film, even an explicit film, about any of these subjects could have an empowering effect, depending on the viewer, the context, and the story told. Intentionally omitting these subjects conveys a message that these acts and these people are perverse and deviant. By censoring sexual speech, the government fails at preventing moral harm and only succeeds in producing shame 24 4 -and shame is undoubtedly more to blame for "corrupting and debasing" the human personality than pleasure ever could be. 24 5 241 Id. at 1656-57. Lena Ramon's experience exemplifies how subtle and literary those moral scripts can be and therefore how unsuited to broad generalizations in the law.
I generally won't do a rape scene. If the sense of the scene is making me feel like "This is something bad that actually happens to women," then I won't do it. But usually all it requires is a slight change in the script or the attitudes of the people working together. Since I'm usually working with people I know and I have a very dominant personality when I'm working, I can make those changes. For example, I was doing this "home invasion" scene where my little white husband supposedly owed the big black man money for drugs, and I end up having sex with the drug-money guy. It started off as a weird, forced scene, but in the middle of it I suddenly said "Wow, it's nice to have a real man around the house!" It was creepy and weird, but to me, it was creepy and weird to me in an okay, fantasy way. I've done abduction scenes that felt okay to me. If I'm being totally honest about it then I think you have to realize that, as a fantasy, it's really hot for a lot of people. I'm not being hurt; I'm not being abducted; I'm not being raped. I'm working with people I know, and it's all in good fun. Ramon, supra note 146. 242 Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1656-57. 243 See Taoromino, supra note 94; The Cambria List, supra note 94. 244 See Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1660-61. Professor Leonore Tiefer argues that, since sexual fantasies are an almost universal part of people's psychological lives, "protecting" women from pornography only results in increasing the shame that women feel for having such fantasies. Tiefer, supra note 237, at 97-100. 245 See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. Rv. 661 (1994-95) (arguing that at least gay male pornography provides a social good-helping gay men find "sexual integrity"-and that fighting for greater acceptance of pornography of this nature is part of the fight to end homophobia and misogyny). Allowing juries to judge the "patent offensiveness" and "prurient appeal" of pornography by "community standards" has served two purposes in the past: It has allowed states and subdivisions of states to set the tone for the speech in their communities, while protecting the right of purveyors of pornography to find markets for their products without offending more conservative communities and risking prosecution. 2 4 7 In 1973, this standard may have been a useful compromise that recognized " [i] t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept the public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.
B. "Community standards" in the
4 8
Although there has been some lack of guidance as to the scope of the relevant community-and confusion emitting from the Supreme Court's decision to enforce national standards with regard to the law's third prong-the standard has persisted for thirty years without serious contention. 249 Scholars now argue that the Internet poses an entirely new challenge that cannot be met by adjusting laws meant for mail distribution, public movie houses, or even television. 2 50 It requires a complete overhaul, if not a rejection, of the obscenity doctrine.
The Internet has expanded the "community" to reach across 246 249 Shafer & Adams, supra note 234, at 24. The Supreme Court leaves the scope of the relevant community to state law for the first two prongs and enforces national standards for the third. This means that in Michigan, for example, a jury will be instructed to answer whether the average American could find "serious value" in the material and whether the average Michigan resident would find it patently offensive and appealing to the prurient interests. Id. If the materials are being evaluated in reference to its suitability for minors, the jury will instead be instructed to ask whether the average resident of their county would find it suitable. Id. at 25 n.32. 481, 514 (1996) . the globe; reduced it to the solitary individual in the privacy of her home; 2 5 ' and fostered specialized "communities" of like-minded people who are free to establish their own standards and revel in their own idiosyncrasies. 252 However this transition is portrayed, it is at least clear that the Internet "community" is not geographically bound. 253 Even if they wanted to, Internet providers could hardly impose geographical limitations on who can access their materials. However, prosecutors can bring suit in any jurisdiction where obscenity is created or received, and juries will apply the standards of that community. 25 4 Because residents of a sleepy town in Mississippi can now pay for and view the same pornography as New Yorkers, the threat of a prosecution under Miller may reduce all of the content available to that appropriate for the least tolerant community. 255 Under the First Amendment, Internet providers can argue that this "lowest common denominator" effect chills speech that might be protected were it in any other medium.
256
The Third Circuit and Supreme Court have begun to hint that a "community standards" approach may be unworkable for the Internet. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court considered the government's first attempt to regulate content on the Internet, the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which attempted to reduce all Internet content to that appropriate for minors. 2 57 The Court unanimously found the Act to be unconstitutional because it affected the non-obscene speech of adults and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. It also found the analogies the government made to other obscenity laws unpersuasive because zoning and other time, place, and manner restrictions are neither effective nor even desirable in the context of the Internet. 258 The Third Circuit considered the government's revision of CDA, the Child Online Protection Act, and found its reliance on "community standards" to be wholly inappropriate to the Internet. 259 The Supreme Court subsequently overturned the Third Circuit, holding that the use of "community standards" did not, by itself, invalidate the Act. 26° However, Justice O'Connor took the opportunity to speculate that, "given Internet speakers' inability to control the geographic location of their audience," crafting a national standard may be the only way to constitutionally regulate the Internet. 2 61 The Supreme Court went on to uphold a preliminary injunction against the law-reengineered as COPA-on remand, and the battle over this statute continues. 2 6 2 Scholars have already proposed replacements to the community-standards approach.
3
This simmering debate is a sign that the Internet challenges the basic assumptions behind this test. The Supreme Court must eventually resolve the insurmountable burden a community standard poses for speech on the Internet. 258 Id. at 867-68. ("According to the Government, the CDA is constitutional because it constitutes a sort of 'cyberzoning' on the Internet. But the CDA applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace."). 259 263 Lawrence Walters and Clyde Dewitt argue on behalf of national standards because of how the Internet has changed the meaning of "community" by being simultaneously more participatory, less regulated, and less intrusive than any other media. Walters & Dewitt, supra note 175, at 60, 63. Partly because of the Internet, we are more homogenous as a nation, and community is defined by interest rather than geography. Id. at 67, 69. The Internet has also rendered nationwide standards knowable; the government can easily monitor what people consume and therefore what is tolerable to them. Id. at 68. Walters and DeWitt imply that the standard for obscenity should track these consumer choices, which would undoubtedly bring the real variety and pervasiveness of porn use to light. In contrast, Mark Cenite argues that national standards, while solving some issues of overbreadth, would raise others. Cenite, supra note 175. The Court would have to choose between using a national average of all community standards, which would still impermissibly restrict speech, or only regulating material offensive to every community in the nation, which would likely result in no regulation at all. Id. at 60-61. Cenite sees the real problem as the categorical exclusion of sexual speech from protection and the real solution as the elimination of community standards altogether. Id.
VII. OUR SECRET GARDEN:
26 4 A NEW SANCTUARY FOR SEXUAL SPEECH Thus far, this Article has discussed why the way sexual speech has been handled under the First Amendment-including how obscenity is distinguished from other pornography-no longer makes sense for our time. It has explored a case that brought pornography under the protection of the Due Process Clause and argued that its reasoning was doctrinally sound. This Part will explore why bringing pornography under the Due Process Clause is not only valid but also desirable for both pornographers and activists who work for sexuality rights.
In working backwards to find a constitutional "home" for a vulnerable right, it is important to ask why pornography should be afforded protection in the first place. Leonore Tiefer, a professor of psychiatry and sex therapist, identifies five concrete harms that befall women when pornography is censored: a loss in empowerment that comes from being overprotected; an increase in the shame and stigmatization that women feel about their sexual fantasies; a loss of opportunity for women to learn about the variety of sexual expression; a loss in income and self-sufficiency for women who work in the sex industry; and the strengthening of the religious right.
2 65 By extrapolation, one can argue that pornography serves the following positive interests: It expands the imagination and increases the empowerment of the viewer by offering the world of sexuality in all its variety to explore; 266 it affirms the selfworth of the viewer by showing she is not alone in having a particular fantasy; it offers the only field of employment where women, gay men, and transgender women are paid twice to ten times more than white, heterosexual men; 26 7 and it offers a mode of personal part of a cultural-and for many a personal-sexual revolution, as it presented a lush variety of fantasies-ranging from married sex, to bisexuality, to rape fantasies and bestiality-without judgment. NANCY FRIDAY, MY SECRET GARDEN (2d ed. 1998). The author republished the book in 1998, asking, "How could it be, you might ask, that women today, at the turn of the century, would still think they were the only Bad Girls with erotic thoughts? What kind of prison is this that women impose on themselves?" Id. at xvi. 265 Tiefer, supra note 237, at 96-100. 266 As Tiefer's essay responded to the radical feminist rejection of pornography, Tiefer framed her arguments in terms of the harm and value of pornography to women. This Article's opinion is that what harms and benefits women, harms and benefits society as a whole. Also, most of what Tiefer describes can be applied to those who are not women.
267 E-mail conversation between Lena Ramon and author (Oct. 1, 2006) (on file resistance to political forces that seek to suppress sexual autonomy. Professor Jeffrey Sherman would add that, for gay men, pornography and the access it provides to depictions of gay male sexuality are an indispensable part of developing self-esteem and beginning to integrate one's sexuality into the rest of one's life. 26 8 As a performer, Lena Ramon spoke of her interests in exploring pornography as an art form; a career that allowed her to pay her college tuition and buy a home; and the valuable relationships that she developed through performing and creating with the same colleagues over the years. 26 9 While opponents of pornography decry its general effect on public morals, it seems that the goods derived from pornography by makers and viewers are more personal and centered in imagination, relationships, identity, expression, and ambition. Professor Greg Magarian summarizes these interests as the pursuit of "personal autonomy. ' 270 He argues that certain kinds of speech are especially good at furthering personal autonomy, while others serve the goal of fostering political debate. 27 1 Speech has not been protected adequately under the First Amendment partially because these vastly different interests have complicated the doctrine.
setting the standard regulations must meet in order to overcome individuals' interest in personal autonomy. The government must justify its regulations on more than enforcement of a moral code; it must prove that the speech causes tangible, concrete harms that its regulations are designed to prevent. 2 75 Magarian advocates for a case-by-case analysis: When a producer is prosecuted for obscenity, she will have the opportunity to present evidence that her products contribute to both her customers' and her own personal autonomy. 276 If she succeeds, the law that infringes on her right to make these materials will be presumed unconstitutional, unless the government proves that her materials cause concrete harms. 2 7 7 The Miller standard, 27 ' as it is based on moral harm and gives no value to personal autonomy interests, would be eliminated. 2 7 9
What standard would take its place? In the 1980s, radical feminists Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon wrote and passed an ordinance for the city of Indianapolis giving women a civil cause of action against purveyors of obscenity that was violent toward, or subordinate of, women. 80 While this standard is unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it blatantly discriminated against pornography on the basis of its political content, 28 ' a substantive due process analysis provides such theories a new opening, as Magarian argues. 2 8 2 If governments imposed such a definition of obscenity, they could argue that the tangible harms to womennamely increased violence towards women and decreased equality in society-overbear pornography producers' and consumers' autonomy interests.
However, any blanket assertion that sexual speech causes tangible harms to women must be examined carefully. In Canada, a similar law was upheld and has become the standard for illegal sexual speech. 28 3 As Mark Silver, who analyzed the Canadian opinion upholding this standard, observed, the analysis focused on the 275 Magarian, supra note 215, at 290-91.
harm to women and equality though it failed to consult the women affected and purportedly harmed. 2 84 It is therefore not surprising that very little data exist to support the idea that obscenity actually causes these harms.
2 85 Scientific studies show that short-term attitudinal changes in men as a result of being exposed to violent pornography are more often the result of the violent content than the sexual content, and there are even studies suggesting that an increase in the availability of pornography decreases aggressive behavior. 2 6 The Canadian court acknowledged that the connection between violent pornography and tangible harms was difficult to prove, but it took a normative approach, guarding against a "reasoned apprehension of harm." ' 2 8 7 Silver concluded that the argument in support of a politically defined obscenity standard was ultimately "a moral argument in the guise of community standards. '28 8 This close examination of the reasons given to regulate pornography-weighed against a real acknowledgement of what good pornography might produce-is exactly why a substantive due process analysis is appropriate for sexual speech. It leads to the development of obscenity laws that, if they exist at all, are based in people's actual experience.
Some jurists will object to this shift based on "the queasiness that reflexively greets any proposal to extend substantive due process." 28 9 Lawrence, however, in its final lines, offers a vision of the Due Process Clause that invites and encourages just this kind of extension: 284 Silver, supra note 280, at 184-85. Lena Ramon was especially offended by this particular theory. "It is so unconscionable to me that people from outside can come up with some half-baked theory and just screw up our lives. It's downright insulting when it starts to be about what harms women because I'm a woman, and I work in this industry." Ramon, supra note 146. 285 Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1664-67. Koppelman outlines the types of studies attempting to prove a link between men's exposure to violent pornography and their tendency to commit violence against women. Id. at 1664. He claims that even the most suggestive of these studies either establish only short-term attitudinal changes that may have no relevance outside of a lab, or they show large-scale trends that fail to prove whether aggressive men tend to watch pornography or whether pornography causes aggression. Id. at 1665. The studies also fail to identify violent pornography over other pornography as a significant predictor of aggression toward women. Id. at 1665-66. 286 Id. at 1665. 287 Butler, [1992] S.C.R. at 504. 288 Silver, supra note 280, at 184-85. 289 Magarian, supra note 215, at 298 ("This argument rests on questionable premises-that any constitutional text provides more than a broad outline for a complex and sophisticated doctrine of rights, that personal freedom should be a stingy exception to the rule of government power, and that judicial innovation contradicts the constitutional design.").
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom. She proposes that the government could start by treating the porn industry like any other industry by imposing OSHA safety regulations, from clean sets to mandated condom use. "In an ideal world we would be able to legislate safe sex. ' 29 4 She says there is enormous resistance to this idea both from the market-driven mainstream of the industry, afraid no one will buy its products, and from porn-performer advocates, afraid that regulation would lead to an even more unsafe underground industry. 2 9 5 Ramon suggested that these factors make this area ripe for government regulation because it would force consistency. . 291 Ramon, supra note 146. 292 The following suggested legal interventions are based on a hypothetical government that acknowledges the value of pornography and of pornographers and porn performers as citizens and artists. Regulation, in such a world, would raise new debates about how best to respect autonomy interests that are not fully fleshed out here. 293 Ramon, supra note 146. 294 Id. 295 Id. 296 Id. buy. "297 Other legal interventions could prevent harm and promote good for both performers and consumers by addressing the porn industry as a workplace and a creative laboratory. Ramon spoke of the unique brands of racism and sexism that have developed in the industry because of the way certain bodies are commodified. 2 9 8 While there is a certain honesty to producing what consumers want, there may also be value in helping porn performers hold the industry to the same non-discrimination standards as other employers. Government, as a funding agency, could also sponsor artistic innovation in pornography or fund small businesses owned by pornographers who are women, people of color, gay, lesbian, and transgender. This kind of state action would advance the viability of speakers who want to use this medium to counter violent messages available in other pornography, while relieving of them of the generalized fear of prosecution under which the entire industry, particularly the innovators, now live.
In the year between Extreme Associates' victory and its loss, the district court opinion was cited by owners of Internet sites; "adult entertainment establishments '' 30 0 or sex clubs; and adult video stores in challenging city zoning ordinances and obscenity laws. 0 ' It was even raised by the plaintiffs challenging Alabama's anti-sex-toy laws in the ongoing Williams case. 30 2 No court other than the Western District of Pennsylvania accepted Extreme Associates' line of argument, even before it was overturned. 30 3 If the case had been upheld, it might have expanded the range of claims available to members of the sex industry. It also may have broadened the boundaries of liberty for all Americans. It was the first successful use of Lawrence that actually reached for the vista to which Lawrence points. Yet the facts only encompassed private consensual sexual speech to which the government sought to attach criminal penalties. When the Supreme Court foreclosed these arguments, it 297 Id.
298 Id. signaled a turn for the worse for sexuality-rights advocates. As Ramon put it, "They're going after the most flamboyant fish now to set a precedent. Then they'll be able to start coming after the rest of us. ' "304 304 Ramon, supra note 267.
